

# Not Your Average App: A Large-scale Privacy Analysis of Android Browsers

**Amogh Pradeep**, Álvaro Feal,  
Julien Gamba, Ashwin Rao,  
Martina Lindorfer,  
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez,  
David R. Choffnes



AppCensus



UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI

# Mobile Browsers as Web Browsers

## Popular

- Over 58% of global website visits in 2022



# Mobile Browsers as Web Browsers

Popular

Handle sensitive browsing data




# Mobile Browsers as Web Browsers


Popular

Handle sensitive browsing data

- Browsing history, logins, etc.




# Mobile Browsers as Mobile Apps




# Mobile Browsers as Mobile Apps

Can access mobile-specific sensitive user data



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
# Mobile Browsers - Questions

How do mobile browsers **harm users**?

- Access mobile-specific user data
- Share data with web hosts
- Fail to implement security measures


How do mobile browsers **protect users**?

- User data
- Browsing the Internet




# Harms - User Data Access

What mobile-specific user data do browsers access?



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
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
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


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
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
What components are responsible for this access?

- 3rd party code analysis



# Protections - Browsing the Internet


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
- Inspect network traffic



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
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- What traffic is legitimate?




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## Baseline browser




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Do browsers share user data with unrelated parties?

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## Baseline browser

- Compare traffic




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
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# Protections - Browsing the Internet

Do browsers share user data with unrelated parties?

Do browsers render websites accurately?




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


# Protections - Browsing the Internet

Do browsers share user data with unrelated parties?

Do browsers render websites accurately?

- Inject with **mitmproxy**
- Obtain rendered content



# Mobile Browsers - Collection & Identification

Google Play and 4 popular Chinese stores



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Google Play and 4 popular Chinese stores

Well known browsers, app category, search for “browser”, etc.



# Filtering False Positives

“Browser” ambiguous



Moto File Manager



Firefox


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
Try launching a website



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
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
- Only browsers pass



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
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- Only browsers pass

Total of **424** browsers



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# Putting It All Together


Multiple browsers

Multiple websites

Mitmproxy

Automate installation and tests

Baseline for ground truth



# Results - Overview

Browsing history collection

Identifier collection

Other harms/protections measured

Combined multidimensional analysis

# Harms - Browsing History Collection

~3% (13 of 424) browsers send browsing history along with identifier(s)

~9% (37 of 424) share browsing history

- Was unrelated to any user-facing browser features

~14% (60 of 424) share browsing history

- Related to known browser feature (sitecheck, suggestion, search, etc.)
- Still poses a potential privacy risk



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3 browsers **bridge IDs** (collect resettable and non-resettable IDs)

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- Collecting IMEI & Ad ID

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2% Play, 6% Chinese browsers collect non-resettable identifiers



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3 browsers **bridge IDs** (collect resettable and non-resettable IDs)

2% Play, 6% Chinese browsers collect non-resettable identifiers

32% browsers collect at least one identifier



# Results - Other Harms and Protections

## Harm Privacy

- 10% fail to validate TLS certificates



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## Harm Privacy


- 10% fail to validate TLS certificates



## Protect Privacy

- 65% block trackers and 51% block scripts (from content modification analysis)
- 2% promote connection security, default to **HTTPS**


# Results - Multidimensional Analysis




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# Mobile Browsers - Wrap Up

Evaluated privacy and security for a large set of mobile browsers

Findings:

- Most browsers (including popular) show mixed behavior
- History leaks are prevalent (~14%)
- *PII* collection is prevalent (~23%)

Apps, data, and analysis code are publicly available

Google disclosure

for the DDP RP program, but the information you provided was passed to our Trust and Safety team, leading to actions being taken against some of the apps.

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<https://neu-sns.github.io/mobile-browsers/>



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**Questions?**