


# Take a Bite

## Finding the Worm in the Apple



**Martina Lindorfer**, Bernhard Miller, Matthias Neugschwandtner, Christian Platzer  
Secure Systems Lab, Vienna University of Technology

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# Introduction



## Is MacDefender Malware a Sign of the Macpocalypse?

By [Tony Bradley](#), PCWorld May 27, 2011 7:06 AM |

## More than 600,000 Macs infected with Flashback botnet

by [Steven Musil](#) | April 4, 2012 6:25 PM PDT

## APPLE '10 YEARS' BEHIND MICROSOFT ON SECURITY: KASPERSKY

**Malware**

by [Steve Evans](#) | 25 April 2012

Welcome to Microsoft's world, Eugene Kaspersky tells Apple

## Mac malware Crisis on Mountain Lion eve?

by [Paul Ducklin](#) on July 25, 2012 | [10 Comments](#)

FILED UNDER: [Apple](#), [Featured](#), [Java](#), [Malware](#), [OS X](#)

## Even Apples sometimes have worms in them, admits Cupertino

**Sinful humans can drag down even angelic Macs**

By [Anna Leach](#), 26th June 2012

Monday, June 25th 2012 at 1:50 pm

## Apple No Longer Claims It's Immune to Viruses

By [Eric Limer](#) ( )

# Introduction



It doesn't get PC viruses.

A Mac isn't susceptible to the thousands of viruses plaguing Windows-based computers. That's thanks to built-in defenses in Mac OS X that keep you safe, without any work on your part.



It's built to be safe.

Built-in defenses in OS X keep you safe from unknowingly downloading malicious software on your Mac.

# Outline






- **Problem Overview**
- iHoneyClient
- Evaluation
- Future Work & Conclusion

# Problem Overview



- Mac OS X reputation of being safe from malware
- Cost-benefit analysis for malware authors
  - Mac OS X currently 9% market share
  - Infection through social engineering (SE):  
Mac users false sense of security?
  - Infection through drive-by downloads:  
Oracle Java, Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Reader
- Several instances of targeted attacks
- Apple slow to react with updates in the past
  - Almost 2 months to fix Java vulnerability targeted by Flashback
- Research in this direction is sparse

# New Malware Samples/Quarter



Source: McAfee Threats Report: First Quarter 2013

# Our Motivation



- Anubis: Analyzing Unknown Binaries  
Public Dynamic Malware Analysis System  
<https://anubis.iseclab.org>



- Windows analysis (since February 2007)  
59,047,857 submissions, 36,885,877 unique files



- Android analysis (since June 2012)  
1,047,366 submissions, 726,853 unique files



- What about Mac OS X?  
How many Mac samples are there in the wild?  
How can we automate their analysis?

# Our Approach




- Detection of Mac malware in the wild
    - Crawl known drive-by download sites
    - High-interaction honeypot simulating the whole system
    - Detect successful exploits through created processes & files
    - Record network activity for further exploit analysis
  - Dynamic Analysis of Mac malware
    - Execute samples in a controlled environment
    - Record system-level activities (created processes & files)
    - Record network activity
- VirtualBox-based **iHoneyClient** (honeypot + analysis mode)

# Outline




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# iHoneyClient Analysis Mode



- Upload and execute sample to iHoneyClient worker VM
- Logging of all system calls and their arguments
- Monitoring of network activity
- Post-processing to create analysis report

# iHoneyClient Honeypot Mode



- Retrieve drive-by download URLs from blacklists
- Preprocess URLs (check availability + content type)
- Visit URL in iHoneyClient worker VM
- Post-processing to detect new infections

# Implementation



- System call logging with DTrace
  - Dynamic tracing framework built-in Mac OS X
  - Static and dynamic kernel-level “probes”
  - Probe executes a script to log system call and arguments
- Challenges:
  - Vanilla Mac OS X not fully supported by VirtualBox
    - “Hackintosh” modifications (custom bootloader, kernel module to simulate genuine Apple HW)
  - Process can set P\_LNOATTACH flag to disallow tracing
    - Kernel module to prohibit setting this flag

# Outline



- Problem Overview
- iHoneyClient
- **Evaluation**
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# 2-Part Evaluation



- Part 1: Evaluation of correct functionality
  - Honeypot mode:  
Detect drive-by download exploits from Metasploit ✓
  - Analysis mode:  
Compare analysis reports with AV threat descriptions ✓
- Part 2: Evaluation on real-world data
  - Honeypot mode:  
Crawl blacklists for drive-by downloads
  - Analysis mode:  
Give overview of current Mac malware behavior

# Honeypot Results



- Blacklists for drive-by download sites
  - Malware Patrol
  - Malware Domain List
  - Clean MX
- 6,028 malicious URLs in January 2013
- 2,844 URLs after filtering
- 288 sites malicious JavaScripts
- 5 successful drive-by downloads
  - Dropped 12 different binaries
  - All Windows binaries!
  - But: exploit was successful (cross-platform exploit!)

# Analysis Results



- 148 Mac samples from VirusTotal in January 2013

29% showed any network activity

- Mainly HTTP, SSL only in 2 samples
- Only 11% resolve IP through DNS
- No fallback mechanisms if connection to server failed

43% performed file modifications

- Only 6% to LaunchAgent entries (for surviving reboot)

14% tried to create processes

- Only 50% of those calls were successful

- Low level of sophistication in examined samples

# Outline



- Problem Overview
- iHoneyClient
- Evaluation
- **Future Work & Conclusion**

# Future Work



- Perform larger-scale analysis
  - e.g. Google Safe Browsing API
- Investigate cross-platform vulnerabilities and malware
  - Mac “infected” by Windows malware
- Integrate iHoneyClient in public dynamic malware analysis system Anubis

# Conclusion



- First to present a dynamic Mac analysis environment
- Also acts as a high-interaction honeypot
- Examined behavior of current Mac malware
- Found little sophistication in existing samples
- Examined > 6,000 URLs for drive-by downloads
- Found no Mac malware in the wild
  - Still successful drive-by downloads (by accident?)
  - No demand (yet) for Mac payloads?
- Results lead us to investigate cross-platform vulnerabilities and malware



# Questions?

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<http://www.iseclab.org/people/mlindorfer>